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Network	effects:	How	the	European	competition
network	structures	the	opportunities	of	regulators
European	administrative	networks	are	networks	of	national	authorities	that
help	facilitate	the	implementation	of	EU	policies,	as	well	as	providing	general
opportunities	for	collaboration	and	the	sharing	of	information.	Drawing	on	a
new	study	of	the	European	Competition	Network,	Francesca	Pia
Vantaggiato,	Hussein	Kassim	and	Kathryn	Wright	highlight	the
importance	of	the	internal	structure	of	networks	in	shaping	their	impact	on
regulatory	authorities.
Networks	linking	national	and	EU	authorities	are	now	an	established	feature	of	the	European	Union.	First
introduced	to	achieve	the	regulatory	harmonisation	needed	for	the	single	market,	while	avoiding	the	politically
unacceptable	centralisation	of	powers	at	the	EU	level,	European	administrative	networks	(EANs)	exist	in	a	wide
range	of	policy	areas	and	perform	a	variety	of	functions.	Most	were	created	to	share	information,	but	a	number,
including	the	European	Competition	Network	(ECN),	also	have	enforcement	responsibilities.
Existing	research	on	EANs	typically	focuses	on	the	external	properties	of	networks.	It	examines	characteristics
observable	from	the	outside,	such	as	origins,	objectives,	and	outputs.	Although	this	approach	has	generated	many
useful	insights,	it	leaves	important	questions	unanswered:	Who	controls	the	networks,	and	how	is	power	distributed
within	them?	What	mechanisms	exist	for	collaboration,	horizontal	and	vertical,	between	members	of	the	network?
What	are	the	regulators’	own	experiences	of	the	network?	What	is	the	impact	of	variation	in	the	expertise,
resources	and	domestic	status	of	European	national	authorities,	and	how,	if	at	all,	are	these	differences	managed
within	networks?
To	address	these	questions,	we	argue	that	the	external	view	of	network	features	needs	to	be	complemented	by	an
examination	of	EANs	from	the	inside.	Our	investigation	of	the	European	Competition	Network	draws	on	semi-
structured	interviews	we	conducted	with	15	National	Competition	Authorities	(NCAs).	Its	findings	underline	the
importance	and	impact	of	network	structure.	The	internal	configuration	of	a	network	can	be	seen	as	an	‘opportunity
structure’	that	offers	regulators	greater	or	lesser	access	that	they	can	use	to	share	resources	and	set	agendas.
The	ECN	was	created	to	ensure	effective	competition	enforcement	throughout	the	EU.	Its	members	include	the
NCAs	of	each	Member	State	as	well	as	the	European	Commission’s	Directorate	General	for	Competition	(DG
COMP).	The	ECN’s	powers	and	responsibilities	are	defined	by	Regulation	1/2003,	while	a	soft	law	Network	Notice
sets	out	rules	on	case	allocation,	consistent	application,	and	mutual	assistance.	Cooperation	takes	place	in	four
main	forums:	Directors	General	meetings,	plenary,	working	groups,	and	sectoral	sub-groups.	Given	its	hierarchical
and	formal	structures,	the	ECN	represents	an	obvious	case	to	investigate	the	importance	of	internal	network
structures.
Regulators’	experience	of	the	network
Our	sample	of	15	NCAs	covered	a	range	from	‘old’	and	‘new’	Member	States,	from	north	and	south,	west,	east	and
central	Europe,	representing	large	and	small	Member	States,	covering	different	sizes	of	national	markets	and	with
different	levels	of	resources.	We	sought	to	assess	the	experience	of	the	operation	and	impact	of	the	network	of
each	NCA	in	four	areas.
First,	we	asked	about	the	extent	to	which	it	is	able	to	voice	issues	of	concern	in	the	ECN	or	to	set	the	ECN’s
agenda,	how	and	at	what	level.	Second,	we	asked	about	levels	of	activity	within	the	network	and	whether	the
network	is	dominated	by	particular	authorities.	Third,	we	included	questions	about	the	network’s	role	in	promoting
convergence	in	enforcement	of	competition	rules,	and	whether	the	ECN	had	enhanced	the	reputation	or	increased
the	autonomy	of	their	NCA.	Fourth,	we	asked	interviewees	about	their	interactions	with	other	network	members,
particularly	the	3-5	NCAs	with	which	they	are	most	frequently	in	contact.
Four	findings	stand	out:
All	NCAs,	whether	from	smaller	or	larger	member	states,	possessing	more	or	fewer	resources	or	ranges	of
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experience,	consider	that	internal	network	structures	allow	them	to	influence	the	network’s	agenda.	In	other
words,	the	internal	structure	of	the	ECN	equalises	opportunities	for	its	members.
Neither	the	Commission	nor	the	NCAs	control	the	network’s	activities	or	agenda,	contrary	to	early	claims
about	the	creation	of	the	ECN.
NCAs	perceive	the	ECN	as	effective.	They	believe	that	it	fosters	a	common	culture	across	the	EU	(although
more	effort	may	be	needed	to	enhance	convergence	of	NCAs’	enforcement	powers	–	the	aim	of	the	2019
ECN	Plus	Directive).	Our	interviewees	also	consider	that	membership	of	the	ECN	strengthens	them	in	their
domestic	settings.
Resources	and	expertise	are	exchanged	informally	between	members	of	the	network.
Curious	about	informal	relations	between	NCAs,	we	utilised	measurements	of	network	analysis	to	further	explore
patterns	of	interaction.	We	were	particularly	interested	in	the	number	of	incoming	connections	of	each	NCA,	which
can	be	seen	as	a	measure	of	network	influence,	and	the	number	of	outgoing	connections	of	each	NCA,	which	is	a
measure	of	network	activism.	Through	statistical	analysis	we	tested	the	strength	of	the	association	between	NCAs’
incoming	and	outgoing	connections,	and	the	number	of	cases	with	which	they	had	dealt	since	the	establishment	of
the	ECN,	as	well	as	the	number	of	their	full-time	staff	resources.	These	relationships	are	shown	in	the	figures
below.
Figure	1:	Informal	network	structure,	showing	node	size	and	the	number	of	incoming	ties	with	other	NCAs
Note:	Shows	respondents	above	minimum	number	of	ties	only.	Triangles	represent	missing	respondents.	For	more	information,	see
the	authors’	accompanying	paper	in	the	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy.
Figure	2:	Informal	network	structure,	showing	node	size	and	the	number	of	outgoing	ties	they	maintain	with
their	peers
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Note:	Node	size	corresponds	to	the	outdegree	of	NCAs,	i.e.	the	number	of	outgoing	ties	they	maintain	with	their	peers.	For	more
information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	paper	in	the	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy.
Figure	3:	Informal	network	structure	(node	size	=	outdegree)
Note:	For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	paper	in	the	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy.
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Summarising	these	findings	on	informal	interactions,	NCAs	with	the	highest	caseloads	are	the	most	sought	after
(Figure	1).	NCAs	with	lower	caseloads	have	more	outgoing	than	incoming	ties.	They	are	searching	for	information
and	valuable	partners	(Figure	2).	NCAs	of	intermediate	staff	size	are	the	most	active	(Figure	3),	which	suggests	that
NCAs	use	external	informal	network	ties	to	compensate	for	a	lack	of	resources.
Conclusion
Our	investigation	of	the	internal	operation	of	the	ECN	highlights	the	importance	of	understanding	how	institutional
architecture	affects	the	experience,	operation	and	effectiveness	of	an	EAN.	Its	results	challenge	early	predictions
that	the	ECN	would	concentrate	power	in	few	hands	or	privilege	the	larger	NCAs.	Although	the	ECN	may	be	an
outlier	to	the	extent	that	it	is	more	formalised	than	most	EANs,	the	finding	that	internal	structure	matters	applies
more	broadly	and	calls	for	similar	investigations	to	be	undertaken	with	respect	to	other	networks.	Indeed,	only	by
examining	an	EAN’s	internal	organisation	is	it	possible	to	understand	how	a	network	distributes	or	redistributes
power	and	resources	among	regulators,	the	pattern	of	informal	collaboration	that	it	encourages,	and	thereby	its	full
impact	on	regulatory	authorities.
For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	paper	in	the	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	The	research	on	which	this	blog	and	the	associated	article	are	based	was	conducted
when	the	three	authors	were	based	at	the	ESRC	Centre	for	Competition	Policy	at	UEA.	The	authors	gratefully
acknowledge	the	Centre	for	funding	the	fieldwork	and	would	also	like	to	express	their	gratitude	to	the	officials	at	15
national	competition	authorities	and	the	European	Commission’s	DG	COMP	for	sharing	their	experiences.
_________________________________
About	the	authors
Francesca	Pia	Vantaggiato	–	King’s	College	London
Francesca	Pia	Vantaggiato	is	Lecturer	in	Public	Policy	at	King’s	College	London.	She	was	formerly	a
member	of	the	Centre	for	Competition	Policy	at	the	University	of	East	Anglia.	Her	research	focuses	on
public	policy,	regulation	and	governance.
Hussein	Kassim	–	University	of	East	Anglia
Hussein	Kassim	is	Professor	of	Politics	in	the	School	of	Politics,	Philosophy,	Language
and	Communication	Studies,	and	a	member	of	the	Centre	for	Competition	Policy	at	the
University	of	East	Anglia.	He	is	also	an	ESRC	Senior	Fellow	under	‘The	UK	in	a
Changing	Europe’	programme.	His	research	examines	EU	institutions	and	policy,	and
EU-member	state	interaction.
Kathryn	Wright	–	University	of	York
Kathryn	Wright	is	Senior	Lecturer	in	Law	at	the	University	of	York.	She	was	formerly	a	Research
Associate	at	the	Centre	for	Competition	Policy	at	the	University	of	East	Anglia.	Her	research	centres
on	EU	law	and	policy-making,	regulation	and	competition,	and	the	role	of	courts	in	governance.
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: Network effects: How the European competition network structures the opportunities of regulators Page 4 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-06-03
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/06/03/network-effects-how-the-european-competition-network-structures-the-opportunities-of-regulators/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
